


























































Un ive rs i t y  o f  He ide lbe rg 
Discussion Paper Series   No. 682  
Department of Economics 
                                                   A Test of Information Aversion                                             




      
    
 
    
 
April 2020 
A Test of Information Aversion∗
Christopher Kops, Illia Pasichnichenko†
Abstract
The standard Bayesian model implies that information can never have a
negative value. We put this implication to the proof. Our paper provides
the first test of the value (positive or negative) of information under uncer-
tainty. We show that the “Bayesian implication” stands in conflict with the
information-averse behavior that is revealed in our experiment. This behavior
demonstrates that the value of truthful and unambiguous information may in-
deed be negative. Our findings complement predictions from recent theoretical
work in showing that negative value of information correlates with ambiguity
aversion. This highlights the importance of counseling for decision-making un-
der uncertainty.
JEL codes: D81, D83, D90
Keywords: Value of Information, Ambiguity Aversion, Ellsberg paradox,
Ellsberg urn
1 Introduction
Information is a means to resolve uncertainty. It has economic value. Examples
run from individual decision-making under uncertainty, to problems of adverse se-
lection and moral hazard in markets with asymmetric information. A lesser known
characteristic of information is that it may just as well increase uncertainty. It may
even do so to the point that it impedes the decision-making process and that people
are inclined to avoid it. This paper proposes a way to test for information aversion
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under uncertainty and presents the results from an experimental implementation
of that test.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to put the value of truthful infor-
mation under uncertainty to a test. Earlier studies have focussed on other aspects
of decision-making in dynamic environments. A related and very recent strand
of the literature studies the value of ambiguous information (Epstein and Halevy,
2019; Liang, 2019; Kellner, Le Quement, and Gerhard, 2019; Shishkin and Ortoleva,
2019). Another strand of the literature put consequentialism and dynamic consis-
tency to a test under uncertainty (Cohen et al., 2000; Dominiak, Duersch, and
Lefort, 2012; Bleichrodt et al., 2019; Esponda and Vespa, 2019). A third strand
documents the prevalence of real-world instances of information aversion (Hertwig
and Engel, 2016; Golman, Hagmann, and Loewenstein, 2017; Brown and Walasek,
2020), running from behavioral finance (Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi, 2009) to
health (Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey, 2013; Ho, Hagmann, and Loewenstein, 2020)
and managerial decision-making (Deshpande and Kohli, 1989).
What separates our approach from all these studies is that we provide a test of
the value of truthful and unambiguous information under uncertainty. Under the
standard Bayesian model, such information can never have a negative value for the
decision maker (DM). As the usual argument goes, she can simply ignore it at no
cost and make a decision as if it was not available to her. Our results in this paper
show that this reasoning stands in conflict with the information-averse behavior
revealed by 62% of participants in our experiment. Furthermore, the behavior we
observe is neither random, nor resulting from confusion, nor caused by indifference,
nor a by-product of dynamic inconsistency, nor is it driven by reasons previously
put forward in the literature on information aversion such as anxiety (Ko˝szegi,
2003; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006; Epstein, 2008), disappointment aversion (Dillen-
berger, 2010; Andries and Haddad, 2017), regret aversion (Kra¨hmer and Stone,
2013; Somasundaram and Diecidue, 2017), optimism maintenance (Brunnermeier
and Parker, 2005; Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey, 2013) and belief investments (Jonas
et al., 2001; Dana, Weber, and Kuang, 2007). Rather, our experiment shows that
information aversion is significantly correlated with ambiguity aversion.
This result confirms the predictions of recent theoretical work (Snow, 2010; Heyen
and Wiesenfarth, 2015; Li, 2019; Galanis, 2019) suggesting a close connection be-
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tween ambiguity aversion and unwillingness to receive partial information. As such,
ambiguity aversion may be a prerequisite for information aversion in the first place.
The real-world and the economics literature are replete with examples supporting
this conclusion. To substantiate this claim and suggest possible applications of our
results, a few examples may be instructive at this point.
Example 1.1 (Financial Crisis of 2007–2008). Consider the study on informa-
tion search by Fischer et al. (2011). In their experiment, participants were given
information suggesting an 80% (or, 20%) chance for the repercussions of the Finan-
cial Crisis of 2007–2008 to get worse in the near future. Then, participants had to
provide their own predictions for it. Before they were asked to do so again, they
received expert statements on the topic and were able to choose between statements
confirming or contradicting the initial information. Results showed a clear prefer-
ence for confirmatory information. Our paper suggests a new interpretation for
this phenomenon, one that is entirely based on ambiguity aversion. Knowing the
chances are 80% (or, 20%), participants avoid contradicting information, precisely
because it makes the situation less clear, less predictable, and more ambiguous.
Example 1.2 (Creation-evolution Controversy). According to a 2014 Gallup
survey, more than four in ten Americans believe that God created humans in their
present form. In the scientific community, evolution by natural selection is accepted
as fact. As such, the theory of evolution and all evidence supporting it is partial
information for an atheist view of the world, at best. Science leaves plenty of room
for God to exist. Why is it then that over 40% of Americans avoid the information
supporting evolution by natural selection? The results from our experiment suggest
that the reason for this may again be ambiguity aversion. People, who are convinced
that certain views of the world are true, avoid information debunking part of it as
untrue, because this creates uncertainty about the world and what to believe in.
Example 1.3 (Echo Chambers). Echo chambers are a metaphorical description
of situations in which people only perceive and seek out information which rein-
forces their existing views. The phenomenon was invoked to explain outcomes of
presidential elections in the United States (Barbera´ et al., 2015) and of the 2016
Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (Del Vicario et al., 2017). Again, one of
the reasons why this phenomenon persists may be because people are averse to the
increase in ambiguity that information contradicting their worldview can create.
New information and its (potentially negative) value are also at the heart of the
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literature on growing awareness (see, among others, Karni and Vierø (2013), Gala-
nis (2015), Karni and Vierø (2017)). In the traditional Bayesian framework, new
information can only shrink the state space and every new observation may rule
out links previously thought possible. The literature on growing awareness, on the
other hand, also considers information which enlarges the state space and opens up
new possibilities never thought of before. Adding to both strands of the literature,
in our experiment, we focus on information that clearly shrinks the state space.
As for our choice of a laboratory experiment, note that the primitive concept in
economics for modeling individual behavior, beliefs and attitudes is choice. Choices
are indeed at the heart of any microeconomic model that aims at delivering quanti-
tative and qualitative predictions about human behavior. Therefore, a clean test of
information aversion should be entirely based on choice data. Specifically, data on
choices between a situation with information and the same situation but without
the information. The issue with this lies in “unknowing” the information from one
situation to the next. While this is nearly impossible to guarantee in the real world,
for a test in the laboratory, we can set up two identical situations, add informa-
tion that pertains to one situation, but not to the other, and ask participants to
choose their preferred situation. This, we feel, is a strength of our test. It allows
participants to experience and familiarize themselves with both situations before
they have to make their choice between the two.
Our findings have important implications for public policy. They suggest that the
majority of people reject information even when material benefits are attached to
it. And, that this continues to be true when they can experience and familiarize
themselves with both the “informed” and “uninformed” situation before they have
to make their decision between the two. As stated before, our results show that
this information-averse behavior is significantly correlated with ambiguity aversion.
Thus, in situations where people perceive subjective ambiguity, extensive counseling
may be required at a very early stage for people to fully grasp the consequences of
their actions. Even earlier and broader than what is common practice. To come full
circle to real-world instances of information aversion alluded to before, this finding
corroborates, for example, the important role of counseling for genetic tests (Oster,
Shoulson, and Dorsey, 2013), career counseling (Deshpande and Kohli, 1989), or,
financial literacy (Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi, 2009).
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The next section establishes the link between theory and experiment. The follow-
ing two sections present the experimental design and the results, highlighting the
correlation between information aversion and ambiguity aversion. The final two sec-
tions discuss our findings in relation to prominent ambiguity models in the decision
theory literature and draw implications for future theoretical developments.
2 A Direct Test
For our experiment, we implemented a direct test of information aversion under
uncertainty that builds on a dynamic version of an Ellsberg-type urn. As stated
in the Introduction, our design allows us to directly compare “informed” and “un-
informed” decisions. To see this, we first illustrate in this section that Savage
acts (Savage, 1954) can be represented in a straightforward manner using bets on
Ellsberg-type urns.
Let S be a finite set of states. Subsets of S are referred to as events, i.e., any
E ⊆ S is an event. Let X denote a set of outcomes. An act f is a function from
S into X. We consider a decision maker (DM) who has preferences < over the
set of all possible acts F . The DM’s preferences conditional on the occurrence of
some event E ⊂ S are denoted by <E. Let V : F → R be a representation of the
DM’s preferences <, and, similarly, VE be a representation of the DM’s conditional
preferences <E.
This definition of the standard framework by Savage (1954) has become a workhorse
for theoretical models of decision-making under uncertainty. With it and with the
representations of the DM’s beliefs and preferences, we can define the concepts of
the value of information, dynamic consistency and ambiguity attitude that we test
in our experiment.
For our experimental test of these concepts, we explicitly pin down states and
outcomes. To this end, let S = {1G, 2B , 3G, 4B} and X = {e 4,e 4.5,e 10,e 10.5}.
From now on, F denotes the set of possible acts between these two sets. An example
of an act is f such that f(s) is equal to e 10 if s = 1G, and to e 4 otherwise.
Our experimental design allows for a direct test of the concepts mentioned above
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and defined in detail below, by representing acts as bets on urns. Consider the
two urns, Urn U and Urn K, in Figure 1. The information available about their
compositions is identical for both urns. Each urn contains 21 balls. Every ball has
a color and is marked with a number. There are five green balls marked with the
number 1 (state 1G) and five blue balls marked with the number 2 (state 2B). Each
of the remaining eleven balls is either green and marked with a 3 (state 3G), or, it
is blue and marked with a 4 (state 4B). The exact number of balls marked with
the number 3 is unknown, as is the exact number of balls marked with the number
4. However, taken together, there are exactly eleven balls marked with a 3 or a 4
in each urn.
The difference between Urn U and Urn K lies in the information about the color of
the randomly drawn ball from it. For any bet on Urn U , the color of the randomly
drawn ball is not known upfront. For any bet on Urn K, on the other hand, the
color of the randomly drawn ball is revealed before participants make their choices.
It is straightforward to see that acts in F can be represented by a bet on the number
of a randomly drawn ball from one of these urns. Our example-act f above can
be represented as a bet on Urn U that pays e 10 if the drawn ball is marked with
number 1 (i.e., if state 1G occurs) and e 4 otherwise (i.e., if any of the states 2B ,
3G, or, 4B occurs).




















































Urn K (color of draw known)
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2.1 Information Aversion
In the framework set up so far, future information about the state of the world can
be represented as a partition of S. The future information of the drawn ball being
green or blue, for example, may be represented as the partition of S into the two
events G = {1G, 3G} and B = {2B , 4B}.
Next, consider some act f ∈ F . Then, the value of the future information {G,B}
for this act f is defined as
V OI = [p(G)VG(f) + p(B)VB(f)]− V (f),
where p is the DM’s prior belief about the states of the world S.
As illustrated before, any act f ∈ F can be represented as a bet on the number
of a randomly drawn ball from Urn U . Offering the same bet on Urn K, we can
represent the act f conditional on knowing upfront whether the color of the drawn
ball is green or blue, i.e., conditional on the event G, or, B.
Following the exposition above, our setup allows to elicit whether the DM’s value
of the future information {G,B} for act f is negative. If the DM prefers the bet
on Urn U to the bet on Urn K both conditional on knowing that the color of the
randomly drawn ball is green and blue, i.e. VG(f) < V (f) and VB(f) < V (f), then
the value of the information {G,B} for this bet is negative.
2.2 Dynamic Consistency
This concept establishes a link between conditional and unconditional preferences.
In a nutshell, it requires that choices made ex-ante are consistently implemented
in the future. In particular, taken together the preferences f ≻ g, g ≻G f , and
g ≻B f are dynamically inconsistent. Clearly, the ex-ante preferences f ≻ g are
inconsistent with the two conditional preferences taken together, because the ex-
ante preferences are not implemented in any subset of the partition of S into G and
B.
As for the test of information aversion, both acts f and g can be represented as a
bet on the number of a randomly drawn ball from Urn U . Offering the same bets
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on Urn K, we can represent the act f (resp., g) conditional on knowing the color
of the drawn ball.
Following the exposition above, our setup allows to elicit whether the DM’s prefer-
ences are dynamically inconsistent. If the DM prefers the bet f to the bet g when
offered on Urn U , but prefers g to f when offered on Urn K conditional on knowing
that the color of the randomly drawn ball is green and also conditional on knowing
that the color of the randomly drawn ball is blue, then the DM’s preferences are
dynamically inconsistent.
2.3 Ambiguity Attitude
Following the ambiguity-literature (for a summary of experimental work on this
topic, see Oechssler and Roomets (2015) and Trautmann and Van De Kuilen
(2015)), we test for the DM’s ambiguity attitude by offering two simple choice
problems. Once, the choice is between two low likelihood bets of which one is risky
and the other is ambiguous. Once, the choice is between two high likelihood bets
of which one is ambiguous and the other is risky. By changing payoffs in one of
the states, the low likelihood risky bet in the first choice problem becomes the high
likelihood ambiguous bet in the second choice problem and vice versa. As for the
different ambiguity attitudes, an ambiguity averse individual, for instance, chooses
a risky bet in both choice problems.
2.4 Underlying Assumptions
To keep the experiment brief and reduce the number of choice problems that par-
ticipants in our experiment have to answer as much as possible, we impose the
following assumptions on their choice behavior.
A1. (State Space) Choices between bets on Urn U and Urn K can be de-
scribed using the same decision-theoretic model with the same set of states S =
{1G, 2B , 3G, 4B}, the same set of outcomes X = {e 4,e 4.5,e 10,e 10.5}, and the
same complete and transitive DM’s preference relation < on the set F of acts, i.e.
functions from S to X.
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Under this assumption, all participants are indifferent between a bet on Urn U
and the same bet on Urn K (before the color is revealed), since the two bets are
indistinguishable in the model. Any participant, therefore, has the same belief
about the composition of each urn. We impose this assumption on our choice data
and control for its validity with a questionnaire at the end of our experiment.
A2. (Color Symmetry) Choices between acts that are symmetric w.r.t. color do
not depend on the color of the ball drawn from Urn K. An act is symmetric w.r.t.
color if it is both constant on {1G, 2B} and on {3G, 4B}.
This assumption implies that participants’ beliefs about the composition of the 11
unknown balls marked with 3 and 4 are symmetric, which mirrors the symmetry
of the information available to participants in our experiment.
A3. (Translation Invariance) For all acts f, g ∈ F , f < g if and only if
f + e 0.5 < g + e 0.5. In other words, increasing payoffs by e 0.5 in each state
of the world does not affect a participant’s choice between the two corresponding
bets.
For a relatively low increase in payoffs as is the case in our experiment, preferences
presumably satisfy translation invariance. For relatively large payoff increases this
assumption may become problematic, as was recently shown by Baillon and Placido
(2019) and Ko¨nig-Kersting, Kops, and Trautmann (2020).
3 Experimental Design
For our experiment, we implemented a test of information aversion under uncer-
tainty that builds on the association between acts and bets on urns laid out in
Section 2. More specifically, our experiment consists of five choice problems. Three
of them were designed to test information aversion under uncertainty and dynamic
consistency. The other two choice problems elicit participants’ ambiguity pref-
erences. In each choice problem, participants are asked to choose between two
different urn-bets. Each choice problem specifies the urn the bets pertain to. It
lays out what is known about the composition of balls in the urn. And it reveals
how much each bet pays depending on the color and number of a randomly drawn
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ball from the urn.
All bets in our experiment refer to the two urns, Urn U and Urn K, in Figure 1.
To reiterate, the difference between Urn U and Urn K lies in the information about
the color of the randomly drawn ball from it. For any bet on Urn U , the color of
the randomly drawn ball is not known. It is only known that this color is either
green or blue. For any bet on Urn K, on the other hand, the color of the randomly
drawn ball is revealed before participants have to make their choices.
3.1 Decision Tasks Designed to Test Information Aversion
In Choice Problem 1 participants are asked to choose between the two bets f1
and g1 on a randomly drawn ball from Urn U , i.e. not knowing the color of the
drawn ball. Table 1 specifies what each bet pays depending on the number that
the randomly drawn ball is marked with.
Table 1: Bets on Urn U (ball color unknown)
5 balls 5 balls 11 balls
1G 2B 3G 4B
f1 e 10 e 10 e 4 e 4
g1 e 4 e 4 e 10 e 10
Notes: 1G is the event that the drawn ball is green and marked with the number 1, 2B
the event of a blue drawn ball marked with a 2, etc.
For Choice Problem 2, a ball is randomly drawn from Urn K before participants
are asked to make their decision between the two urn-bets of this choice problem.
Participants receive the information about the color of the drawn ball, but the
number it is marked with remains unknown to them. Say, the color of the randomly
drawn ball is green. Then, participants receive this information and can infer from
their information about Urn K that this ball can only be marked with a 1 or a
3. Table 2 specifies what each bet pays depending on the color and number that
the randomly drawn ball is marked with. In our example of a green drawn ball, f2
pays e 10.5 if this ball is marked with a 1 and e 4.5 if it is marked with a 3. g2, on
the other hand, pays e 4.5 if this ball is marked with a 1 and e 10.5 if it is marked
with a 3.
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Table 2: Bets on Urn K (ball color known)
5 balls 5 balls 11 balls
1G 2B 3G 4B
f2 e 10.5 e 10.5 e 4.5 e 4.5
g2 e 4.5 e 4.5 e 10.5 e 10.5
In Choice Problem 3, participants are asked to choose between their answers to the
first and the second choice problem. That is, they can choose between the bet on
Urn U they have chosen in the first choice problem and the bet on Urn K they
have chosen in the second choice problem. Let c(fi, gi) specify a participant’s bet
chosen in choice problem i, for i = 1, 2. Then, in the third choice problem, this
participant is asked to choose between
c(f1, g1) vs. c(f2, g2)
Say, a participant has chosen g1 in Choice Problem 1, i.e., c(f1, g1) = g1, and g2
in Choice Problem 2, i.e., c(f2, g2) = g2. Then, in the third choice problem, she
is asked to choose between g1 and g2. Note that g1 still pertains to Urn U where
nothing is known about the color of the randomly drawn ball. On the other hand,
g2 still pertains to Urn K where the color of the randomly drawn ball is known
upfront.
For our interpretation of participants’ choices in this decision task, it is important
that the first two assumptions of Section 2.4 hold. As mentioned before, the ques-
tion regarding participants’ beliefs about urn-compositions in our questionnaire
serves as a control for whether these assumptions about participants’ beliefs are
justified.
We can classify participants choosing bet c(f1, g1) (resp., bet c(f2, g2)) as showing
a negative value of information (resp., a non-negative value of information). Note
that f2 = f1+e 0.5 and g2 = g1+e 0.5. Therefore, a preference for c(f1, g1) means
that the DM leaves money on the table in exchange for not knowing the color of
the randomly drawn ball upfront. Since all bets in Choice Problem 1 and 2 are
symmetric w.r.t. color, this observation does not depend on whether the color of
the ball that was actually drawn is green or blue.
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It is straightforward to see that the information about the color of the randomly
drawn ball reduces the (objective) uncertainty about the true state of the world.
Not knowing the ball color, the true state of the world lies in the set {1G, 2B , 3G, 4B}.
Knowing the color of the randomly drawn ball, say it is green, the true state of
the world lies in the set {1G, 3G}. A clear reduction in uncertainty. On the other
hand, given how the bets in Choice Problem 1 align with the underlying information
about the number of balls marked with numbers 3 or 4, information about the color
of the randomly drawn ball may increase the (subjective) uncertainty attached to
these bets.
To see this, observe that, for the first choice problem, while there is uncertainty
about the exact number of balls marked with a 3 (resp., with a 4), the winning
probabilities under each bet in this choice problem are objectively given. The
probability of winning e 10 is 10
21
under act f1 and
11
21
under act g1. For the second
choice problem, this is not true. With the information about the color of the ran-
domly drawn ball, winning probabilities under each bet in this choice problem are
not objectively given anymore. What is objectively known is that the probability
of winning e 10.5 lies in the interval [ 5
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under act g2. Hence, information about the ball color may clearly lead to an in-
crease in subjective uncertainty and, therefore, push an individual who is averse to
such an increase to pass on the benefits that the second choice problem involves.
Figure 2 shows the negative value of the information {G,B} for an ambiguity averse
DM in Choice Problem 1. The DM is assumed to have maxmin expected utility
preferences (MEU) and to be risk neutral (see Section 5.2 for the calculations). Note
that a DM who is considerably ambiguity averse is willing to forego the e 0.5 bonus
payment offered in Choice Problem 2 in order to keep ambiguity to a minimum by
avoiding the ex ante information about the ball color.
Finally, consider the following normatively appealing, Bayesian-like reasoning: First,
the draw of a, say green, ball from Urn K, suggests that this draw was more likely
than that of a blue ball from this urn. This is even true when the assumption of
color symmetry does not hold and beliefs about color are not too asymmetric. A
participant in this case should choose g2 over f2, because the green draw suggests
larger winning probabilities for g2 than for f2. Note that this is even true in the
case of a blue draw. Next, the participant should also choose g2 over c(f1, g1),
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Figure 2: Value of the information {G,B} in MEU
because payoffs are larger and the draw of a green ball suggest that the winning
probabilities for g2 are not lower than the ones for c(f1, g1).
3.2 Decision Tasks Designed to Test Dynamic Consistency
Under our assumptions from Section 2.4, we can classify participants choosing bet
f1 from Choice Problem 1 and bet f2 from Choice Problem 2, or, bets g1 and g2 as
dynamically consistent. All other participants, i.e., those choosing f1 and g2, or,
g1 and f2, we can classify as dynamically inconsistent.
To see why preferences for f1 and g2 are dynamically inconsistent, note that f2 =
f1 + e 0.5 and g2 = g1 + e 0.5. Hence, by translation invariance, f1 ≻ g1 implies
f2 ≻ g2. If, say, a green ball is drawn from Urn K for Choice Problem 2, by color
symmetry, g2 ≻G f2 implies g2 ≻B f2. Taken together, the preferences f2 ≻ g2,
g2 ≻G f2, and g2 ≻B f2 are dynamically inconsistent. The same reasoning also
establishes that the preferences for g1 and f2 are dynamically inconsistent, as well.
3.3 Decision Tasks Designed to Test Ambiguity Aversion
In Choice Problem 4 and 5, participants choose between two bets on Urn U (see
Table 3). Note that the bets in these two choice problems differ only in their payoffs
in state 4B . By the usual interpretation, participants choosing bets f4 and g5 (resp.,
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g4 and f5) are classified as ambiguity averse (resp., seeking). All other participants,
i.e., those choosing f4 and f5, or, g4 and g5, are classified as ambiguity neutral.
Table 3: Bets on Urn U (ball color unknown)
5 balls 5 balls 11 balls
1G 2B 3G 4B
f4 e 10 e 4 e 4 e 4
g4 e 4 e 4 e 10 e 4
f5 e 10 e 4 e 4 e 10
g5 e 4 e 4 e 10 e 10
A problem common to ambiguity related experiments is how to deal with indiffer-
ence. We tackle this problem in two ways. First, the number of ambiguous balls
(3G and 4B balls) is one larger than the number of risky balls (1G and 2B). This
extra ball acts as a tie breaker. Hence, preference for f4 over g4 cannot be explained
by indifference alone. Second, for each choice problem, we asked participants about
their confidence in their choices such that we could interpret participants stating
the lowest level of confidence as having no confidence that their choice is better than
the alternative in this choice problem, i.e., as being indifferent between the two op-
tions. In Section 4.5, we use this measure as a robustness check in the analysis of
our results.
3.4 Implementation & Lab Procedures
The experiment was conducted in November and December 2019 in the AWI Lab at
the University of Heidelberg. We implemented the above-described decision tasks as
a pen-and-paper experiment. Subjects were recruited via SONA System and paid
in cash directly after the experiment. All participants received a show-up fee of e 4
and could earn up to e 10.5 from the decision tasks. The experiment took about 45
minutes, for which participants earned, on average, e 12.8. Before each session, the
boxes were checked to contain the correct distribution of colored, marked balls.1
1For practical reasons, in the laboratory, we used non-transparent, colored balls that could be
opened and filled each with a folded piece of paper that was marked with a number from one to
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Participants did not have any information as to what the distribution of the eleven
ambiguous balls in each box were, but the physical boxes were visibly placed on the
experimenter’s table for all subjects to see and could be inspected by participants
after each session. Before decision sheets were distributed, uncertainty about the
ball color of the randomly drawn ball from Urn K was resolved by drawing the
ball physically with the help of a randomly selected participant. Its color was
announced and the ball remained unopened on top of the cardbox, for everyone to
see, until the end of the experiment. So, the number it was marked with remained
unknown. Participants marked their choices on the decision sheets and answered a
demographic questionnaire including our question about urn-compositions. Then
uncertainty about which of the five choice problems determined participants’ payoffs
was resolved with the help of another randomly selected participant. Final payoffs
were calculated, participants were paid and dismissed from the lab.2
3.5 Summary Statistics
In total, 115 subjects participated in the experiment. Participants’ average age was
23.2 years, and the share of economics students was 25.2%. With 56.5%, the share
of female participants is reasonably close to 50% in our experiment.
4 Results
4.1 Negative VOI
Our main research question is whether subjects do assign a negative value to infor-
mation under uncertainty. Such participants would choose their solution to Choice
Problem 1 over their solution to Choice Problem 2, when it comes to their choice
between these two bets in Choice Problem 3. Table 4 shows the percentage of
participants that made negative VOI-choices. The main result of our study is very
four. Furthermore, instead of urns we used cardboxes.
2All files necessary for replicating the experiment and the results are available on University of
Heidelberg’s data repository at https://doi.org/10.11588/data/G0RNAZ. Instructions were trans-
lated from German. Original instructions are available from the authors upon request.
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clear: at 61.7%, the share of participants showing a negative value of information
is substantial.
Table 4: Share of Negative VOI
Choice Problem 3 Share N
c(f1, g1) vs. c(f2, g2) 61.7% VOIneg ** 115
Notes: VOIneg = negative value of information. Column “Share” shows percent-
age of c(f1, g1) chosen in Choice Problem 3. Binary choice: Two-sided binomial
test against p = 0.5. ** denotes significance at 5%.
As discussed in Section 3, our conclusion above rests on participants having similar
beliefs about the compositions of both urns. In a questionnaire at the end of the
experiment, we asked participants for their estimates of the number of green balls
in each urn. For those participants who showed negative VOI and for those who did
not, we calculated the average distance between estimates of the number of green
balls in Urn U and in Urn K. In line with our assumption of similar beliefs about
urn-compositions, there was no significant difference between the estimates of the
number of green balls for each urn (p = 0.208, two-sided t-test).
Motivated by recent theoretical work (Li, 2019; Eichberger and Pasichnichenko,
2020), we checked whether negative VOI is correlated with ambiguity aversion.
Indeed, Table 5 shows that subjects making negative VOI-choices were significantly
more (often) ambiguity averse than subjects making non-negative VOI-choices. On
the other hand, the latter group was significantly more (often) ambiguity neutral
than the group making negative VOI-choices. Among ambiguity averse subjects,
76.9% showed a negative value of information. Thus, our findings are in line with
the predictions of recent theoretical contributions. The fact that we were able to
replicate the relationship between VOI and ambiguity attitude suggested by (Li,
2019) counteracts worries that our results stem from subjects’ choices being random
or driven by confusion. This lends further credence to the robustness of our results.
We asked participants about their confidence in their choices for each decision task.
Participants who made negative VOI-choices were significantly less confident in
their choices for Choice Problem 2 than in their choices for Choice Problem 1 com-
pared to participants who made non-negative VOI-choices (difference in confidence
between decision tasks: VOIneg 1.14 vs. VOInonneg 0.41, p = 0.002, two-sided
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Table 5: Negative VOI, Ambiguity Attitude and Dynamic Inconsistency
All Non-negative VOI Negative VOI
Share Share Share p-values
Ambiguity averse 33.9% 20.5% 42.3% 0.012 **
Ambiguity neutral 59.1% 70.5% 52.1% 0.048 **
Ambiguity seeking 7.0% 9.0% 5.6% 0.506
Dynamic inconsistency 35.7% 29.5% 39.4% 0.279
Notes: N = 115. Non-negative VOI: 44; negative VOI: 71. Columns “Share” show percentages in
these two subgroups of ambiguity averse (f4 ≻ g4 and g5 ≻ f5), neutral (f4 ≻ g4 and f5 ≻ g5, or,
g4 ≻ f4 and g5 ≻ f5) and seeking choices (g4 ≻ f4 and f5 ≻ g5), as well as dynamically inconsistent
choices (f1 ≻ g1 and g2 ≻ f2, or, g1 ≻ f1 and f2 ≻ g2). Two-sided t-test. ** denotes significance at
5%.
t-test). The larger drop in confidence for neg-VOI participants is exactly what we
would expect from participants who prefer to avoid partial information.
Finally, in our data, there is no significant correlation between negative value of
information and dynamic inconsistency. Table 5 shows that the percentage of dy-
namically inconsistent choices is larger among participants who made negative VOI-
choices than among those who made non-negative VOI-choices. But this difference
is not statistically significant.
4.2 Ambiguity Attitudes
We find some support for the common finding of a fourfold pattern of ambiguity
attitudes (Kocher, Lahno, and Trautmann, 2018) restricted to the gain domain.
That is, we observe statistically significant ambiguity aversion for high likelihood
gain prospects. At the same time, we observe that choices imply attitudes closer
to ambiguity seeking or neutrality for the case of low likelihood gains (high 82.6%
(95) vs. low 44.3% (51), p < 0.001, two-sided t-test). The share of risky choices is
significantly lower for low likelihood gains than for high likelihood gains. The fact
that we replicate large parts of the fourfold pattern of ambiguity attitudes restricted
to the gain domain lends further credence to the robustness of our results.
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Table 6: Gain-domain Part of Fourfold Pattern
High (52%) Low (24%)
Gain
Choice Problem 4 & 5 82.6% AA *** 44.3% AS n.s.
Notes: High / Low designate the probabilities of gain realizations. The cells
show percentages of risky prospects chosen and the ambiguity attitude implied:
AA = ambiguity averse; AS = ambiguity seeking. Binary choice: Two-sided
binomial test against p = 0.5. *** denotes significance at 1%.
4.3 Dynamic Consistency
According to participants’ responses to Choice Problems 1 and 2, we can classify
them as dynamically consistent or not. Table 7 shows that 64.3% of all participants
in our experiment are dynamically consistent. This result changes when we look
at the subgroup of participants who are ambiguity averse according to the last
two decision tasks. In line with the results by Dominiak, Duersch, and Lefort
(2012), ambiguity averse participants are significantly more (often) dynamically
inconsistent (51.3% vs. 27.6%, p = 0.016, two-sided t-test). On the other hand,
ambiguity neutral participants are significantly more (often) dynamically consistent
(75.0% vs. 48.9%, p = 0.005, two-sided t-test).
Table 7: Share of Dynamically Consistent Choices
Decision Tasks 3 & 4 Share N
f1 ≻ g1 iff f2 ≻ g2 64.3% DC *** 115
Notes: DC = dynamic consistency. Column “Share” shows percent-
age of choices f1 and f2 (resp., g1 and g2) in Choice Problems 1
and 2. Binary choice: Two-sided binomial test against p = 0.5. ***
denotes significance at 1%.
4.4 Gender Effect
Finally, we also find a gender effect insofar as the share of males is significantly
smaller among those participants who are information-averse than among those




As was already mentioned, we did not offer an indifferent option. However, ad-
ditional to each decision, participants were asked to mark “How strong is your
preference for the alternative you choose?” on a scale ranging from 1 (very weak)
to 5 (very strong). Subjects who marked one could be interpreted as having no
confidence that their choices are better than the alternatives, that is, as being in-
different. As a robustness check, we discard them from the analysis. All results
stay valid with two exceptions. That is, 1) Table 5, ambiguity neutral: VOIneg
vs. VOInonneg, p = 0.058, i.e. lower level of significance, 2) Section 4.3, dynamic
inconsistency: ambiguity averse vs. not ambiguity averse, p = 0.067, i.e. lower
level of significance.
5 Theoretical Discussion
5.1 Subjective Expected Utility
As stated in the Introduction, information can never have a negative value for a
Bayesian DM, since it is assumed that she maximizes subjective expected utility.
In particular, consider the value of information {G,B} in Choice Problem 1:















where the maximums are taken over h ∈ {f1, g1}. One can see that the value of
information is non-negative for any prior belief p.


























. Then all three
maxima are attained at g1. Clearly, the information {G,B} is of zero value to a
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Bayesian DM. Hence, she would never forego the increase in payments offered in
Choice Problem 2.
5.2 Maxmin Expected Utility
Non-Bayesian DMs may be averse to information (Wakker, 1988). Note that while
there is only one way to be Bayesian, there are many ways to be non-Bayesian. This
section invokes maxmin expected utility (Ivanenko and Labkovsky, 1986; Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989) as the alternative approach and discusses the results from
our experiment within the MEU-framework. More specifically, we consider an am-
biguity averse DM with MEU-preferences. Such a DM’s beliefs form a set of prior
probability distributions on the state space and she ranks acts by maximizing the
minimal expected utility with respect to this set of priors.


































: −ε ≤ x ≤ ε
}
Here, 0 ≤ ε ≤ 5.5 measures DM’s subjective ambiguity. In other words, ε captures
the range of the number of 3G-balls that she deems possible. For instance, if ε = 1.5,
then the DM thinks that the urn contains between four and seven 3G-balls.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that u(e 4) = 0 and u(e 10) = 1. Then, for


















Thus, f4 ≻ g4 if ε > 0.5. On the other hand, since
I(f5) = min−ε≤x≤ε












this implies that g5 ≻ f5. In this way, MEU can explain ambiguity averse choices
in Choice Problem 4 and 5 of our experiment.
In Choice Problem 1, the payoffs under each act nicely align with the uncertainty






, and so g1 ≻ f1. Suppose now that while
choosing between f1 and g1, the DM is offered information, whether the drawn
ball is green or blue. To estimate the value of such information, we first calculate
the values of the two hypothetical choice problems – the choice between f1 and g1
conditional on the event G and the choice between f1 and g1 conditional on the
event B. To do this, we need to update the DM’s priors and calculate the minimal





























: −ε ≤ x ≤ ε
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≈ 2.3 and g1 ≻G f1 otherwise. The value of
the choice problem, VG, is the utility of the best act, i.e.,
VG = max {IG(f1), IG(g1)} =


IG(f1), if ε ≥ ε
∗
IG(g1), otherwise
By symmetry, VB = VG.
Finally, the value of information about the color of the drawn ball is equal to the
minimal expected increase in the value of the choice problem with respect to the
set of priors C, i.e.,
VOI = min
p∈C
[p(G)VG + p(B)VB ]− V0.
Since VG = VB , we have
VOI = VG − V0.
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Note that the value of the original choice problem is given by
V0 = max{I(f1), I(g1)} =
11
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If ε∗ ≤ ε ≤ 5.5, then







On the other hand, if 0 ≤ ε < ε∗, then







Therefore, an ambiguity averse DM with MEU-preferences is averse to information
about the color of the drawn ball. Only in the extreme case (of a Bayesian) where
C is a singleton set, we have ε = 0 and VOI = 0.
Recall that the parameter εmeasures a DM’s subjective ambiguity. The more ambi-
guity averse a DM is, the more money she will pay/forego to avoid the information.
For any ε, we can calculate the value of information {G,B} and, by assuming
risk neutrality, convert utility units to monetary amounts. Figure 2 in Section 3.1
graphically illustrates this relationship. Put differently, it illustrates the monetary
amount required to compensate an ambiguity averse DM with MEU-preferences for
the negative value of the information {G,B}. For example, if the DM thinks that
the urn contains between four and seven 3G-balls, which corresponds to ε = 1.5,
then she will choose a bet on urn K only if the bonus payment is at least e 0.48.
6 Conclusion
We set out to study the value of information. Specifically, the value of partial
information under uncertainty. We provide the first test of whether this value
can be negative or not. The findings from our experiment show that at 61.7% the
percentage of individuals showing a negative value of information is very substantial
and robust. This is not to say that the value of information is always negative.
Rather, it shows that if information is partial and has the potential to increase
subjective uncertainty, then people will be inclined to “pay” for not having the
information. Figure 2 shows there is an upper limit as to what price people are
willing to pay for such ignorance.
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Furthermore, our results show that information-averse individuals are significantly
more ambiguity averse. The economics and psychology literature has previously
put forward reasons for information aversion such as disappointment aversion, re-
gret aversion, optimism maintenance and belief investments (Golman, Hagmann,
and Loewenstein, 2017). Our results cannot confirm that these are the reasons
behind the information aversion we observe. Rather, our experiment shows that
information aversion is significantly correlated with ambiguity aversion.
Finally, our theoretical and experimental results have important implications for
public policy. In particular, they suggest that many people reject information even
when monetary benefits are attached to it. And, that this continues to be true when
they can experience and familiarize themselves with both the “informed” and “un-
informed” situation. Furthermore, our results show that this information-averse
behavior is significantly correlated with ambiguity aversion. Thus, in situations
where people perceive subjective ambiguity, extensive counseling may be required
at a very early stage for people to fully grasp the consequences of their actions. To
come full circle to real-world instances of information aversion alluded to in the In-
troduction, this finding corroborates, for example, the important role of counseling
for genetic tests (Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey, 2013), financial literacy (Karlsson,




VOINEG AGE RELIG ECON STAT RIGHT MALE DYNINC AMBA AMBS
AGE -0.17*
RELIG -0.04 0.06
ECON -0.08 -0.20** 0.01
STAT -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.25***
RIGHT -0.11 -0.07 0.09 0.00 0.01
MALE -0.19** 0.13 -0.05 0.15 0.27*** 0.17*
DYNINC 0.10 -0.08 0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.27*** -0.09
AMBA 0.22** -0.10 0.02 -0.12 0.09 -0.12 -0.10 0.23**
AMBS -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.26*** 0.06 0.04 0.08 -0.20**
AMBN -0.18* 0.10 -0.01 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.07 -0.27*** -0.86**** -0.33****
Notes: N = 115. VOINEG = negative value of information, AGE = participant’s age, RELIG = religious, ECON =
economics student, STAT = took a statistics course, RIGHT = right political views, MALE = male gender, DYNINC
= dynamically inconsistent, AMBA = ambiguity averse, AMBS = ambiguity seeking, AMBN = ambiguity neutral.
Two-sided t-test. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%, and **** at 0.1%.
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